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The Rescue of American International Group 
Module F: The AIG Credit Facility Trust1 
Alec Buchholtz2 and Aidan Lawson3 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
February 19, 2020, revised: April 15, 2021 
Abstract 
In September 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) experienced a liquidity crisis. 
To avoid the insurance giant’s bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) 
extended an $85 billion emergency secured credit facility to AIG. In connection with the 
credit facility, AIG issued 100,000 shares of preferred stock, with voting rights equal to and 
convertible into 79.9% of the outstanding shares of AIG common stock, to an independent 
trust (the Trust) set up by the FRBNY. Three trustees held the stock for the sole benefit of 
the US Treasury, exercised the rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties of the 
preferred stock, and acted as the beneficial owner of AIG. On January 14, 2011, the Trust 
converted the preferred stock into AIG common stock, and, after transferring the common 
stock to the Treasury’s General Fund, the Trust effectively dissolved. Over the next two years, 
Treasury sold the common stock in a series of six public offerings returning a profit to the 
government. The government’s equity investment and the Trust were controversial, raising 
debate about nationalization, transparency, and independence of the Trustees. 
Keywords: AIG, credit facility, equity, liquidity, preferred stock, trust, voting rights
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At a Glance 
On September 22, 2008, American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG) signed a 
Credit Agreement with the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to 
access an $85 billion emergency credit 
line, the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF), 
secured by AIG’s assets, including 
equity interests in its insurance and 
other subsidiaries. AIG was also to sell 
to the government 100,000 shares of 
AIG Series C perpetual, convertible, 
participating preferred stock, which 
had dividend and voting rights equal to, 
and was convertible into, 79.9% of 
AIG’s outstanding common shares. The 
preferred shares were to be held and 
managed for “the sole benefit of the 
Treasury” by an independent trust, 
overseen by three trustees (the 
Trustees) appointed by the FRBNY in 
consultation with the US Treasury 
Department. The Trustees were 
authorized to exercise all “rights, 
powers, authorities, discretions, and 
duties” of the preferred stock. 
On March 4, 2009, AIG sold the shares 
(the Trust Stock) to the Trust for 
$500,000. The Trust Stock could be 
converted only after termination of the 
RCF, which could terminate only after repayment of all amounts due under the Credit 
Agreement.  
Upon the execution of AIG’s Recapitalization Plan on January 14, 2011, AIG repaid the 
remaining balance under the RCF to the FRBNY, terminating the Credit Agreement. This 
permitted the Trust to convert the Trust Stock into 563 million shares of common stock and 
transfer such stock to the Treasury Department, subsequently dissolving the Trust. The 
common stock received from the conversion of the Trust Stock, plus other AIG common 
shares that it held, were gradually sold off by the Treasury Department through late 2012. 
Summary Evaluation 
The FRBNY designed the Trust to be independent, because FRBNY officials concluded that 
the FRBNY did not have the legal authority to own and control a large private company. Still,  
some members of Congress and others criticized the Trust’s design as opaque and 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To “establish an independent trust for the sole 
benefit of the Treasury,” to act as the beneficial owner of 
AIG, and to create a divestiture plan for the sale or 
disposition of the preferred stock 
Announcement Date  September 22, 2008 
Establishment Date January 16, 2009 
Dissolution Date  January 14, 2011  
Beneficiary US Treasury General Fund 
No. of Trustees 3 
Trustees Compensation  $100,000 + expenses 
Funder of Trust AIG  
No. of Shares Managed 100,000  
Class of Shares Managed Series C perpetual, 
convertible, participating 
preferred stock 
Share Issuance Date March 4, 2009 
Share Conversion Date January 14, 2011 
Shares Issued on 
Conversion 
562,868,096 common stock 
shares 
Consideration $500,000, plus FRBNY 
lending commitment 
Liquidation Preference $500,000 in aggregate 
American International Group, Inc.: 
The AIG Credit Facility Trust 
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questioned its role. Over the Trust’s lifespan, the Trustees nominated and elected 11 of AIG’s 
13-member board of directors. The Trustees met regularly during 2010 to discuss a 
divestiture plan for the Trust Stock and worked alongside a Government Repayment 
Committee composed of AIG outside directors. 
  
179





American International Group:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
 
Sovereign credit rating (Five-
year senior debt) 
 











Size of banking system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP 
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of financial system 
 
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial 
system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial 
system in 2008 
Five-bank concentration of 
banking system 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government ownership of 
banking system 
 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for 
2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank, 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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In the midst of the financial crisis in 2008, American International Group (AIG), one of the 
largest insurance companies in the world, faced a liquidity crisis and multibillion-dollar 
losses on its mortgage-linked products and investments.4 The Federal Reserve Board voted 
to invoke Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to enable the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (FRBNY) to mitigate AIG’s liquidity woes by announcing the Revolving Credit 
Facility (RCF) on September 16, 2008. The RCF was an $85 billion, two-year loan 
commitment secured by AIG’s assets, including interests in its domestic and foreign 
insurance subsidiaries. The Fed said that the government would take a 79.9% equity interest 
in AIG (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2008; FRBNY 2008b, Sec. 2.04[a], 40).  
The following week, the Fed and AIG signed the Credit Agreement establishing the RCF; this 
included further details about the structure and governance of the government’s equity 
stake. First, the government was to receive 100,000 shares of convertible participating 
preferred stock (the Trust Stock), convertible into a number of common shares equal to 
79.9% of the shares then outstanding or reserved for issuance5 (FRBNY 2008b, Sec. 5.11, 
Exhibit D). (See also Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a.) After deciding on preferred stock as the 
method of its equity stake, the government subsequently determined that it should create an 
independent trust (the Trust) to manage its investment in AIG (YPFS 2018; Wiggins et al. 
2021). The Trust Stock carried voting and dividend rights proportionate to its convertible 
share of common stock (originally 79.9%),6 effectively giving the Trust control over the 
company (FRBNY 2008b, Sec. 5.11, Exhibit D).  
The Trust was established “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, and disposing of the Trust 
Stock,” the issuance of which was “intended to provide compensation for the assumption of 
the risks arising from the Credit Agreement and to reduce those risks” (FRBNY 2009a, 1).   
According to the FRBNY’s September 29, 2008 press release, the Trust Stock also “ha[d] the 
potential to provide a substantial financial return to the American people,” so long as the RCF 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4 These were credit default swap contracts sold by its Financial Products division that were exposed to the 
U.S. housing market and investments purchased with proceeds from its Securities Lending practice. 
(Congressional Oversight Panel 2010, pp. 7, 24, fn 21.) 
 
5 The series of the Trust Stock was not originally designated. However, after Treasury purchased a separate 
class of AIG preferred stock using Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds in November 2008, the 
preferred stock was then deemed Series C perpetual, convertible, participating preferred stock and ranked 
junior to the newly purchased Series D TARP preferred stock (FRBNY 2008a). 
 
6 While the Trust Stock was originally designed to be convertible into 79.9% of AIG’s common stock, in 
November 2008, the terms of the Trust Stock were amended to decrease the convertibility to approximately 
77.9% of AIG’s common stock (FRBNY 2008a, Sec. 6; AIG 2008a). This change was made to adjust for a 
November 2008 investment by Treasury whereby it purchased $40 billion (4 million shares) of Series D 
preferred stock and also received a 10-year warrant to purchase 2% of AIG’s outstanding common stock (AIG 
2008a). The Trust Stock was adjusted to keep the government’s potential ownership under 80%, the level at 
which it would have to consolidate AIG onto the government’s balance sheet. 
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provided AIG with adequate support to sustain itself (FRBNY 2008c). (See Buchholtz and 
Lawson 2021a for more information on terms of the Credit Agreement.) 
Program Description 
Consistent with the Credit Agreement and pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated January 16, 
2009, the FRBNY established the Trust to receive, hold, and manage the Trust Stock (FRBNY 
2009a, Preamble). The Trust Agreement stated that the trust was “designated as the AIG 
Credit Facility Trust for the sole benefit of the Treasury, which, for the avoidance of doubt, 
means that any property distributable to the Treasury as a beneficiary hereunder shall be 
paid to the Treasury for deposit into the General Fund as miscellaneous receipts” (FRBNY 
2009a, Sec. 1.01, 2). The Trust was revocable only by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(FRBNY 2009a, Sec. 1.03, 2–3). 
The Trustees were appointed by the FRBNY, in consultation with Treasury, on the basis of 
their having “integrity, impeccable reputations in the marketplace, and a unique 
combination of experience successfully leading major corporations and working in the 
public sector” (FRBNY 2010a). Trustees could resign on 60 days’ notice and the FRBNY, in 
consultation with the Treasury, could appoint successor Trustees (FRBNY 2009a, 11).   A 
Trustee could also be removed by the other Trustees, in consultation with the FRBNY, if they 
unanimously determined that “replacement of such Trustee [was] in the best interests of the 
Trust” (FRBNY 2009a, 11).     
The Trust Agreement contained a number of provisions designed to maintain  its 
independence. These included provisions (i) giving the Trustees “absolute discretion and 
control over the Trust Stock including how to exercise the voting rights, (ii) limiting the 
Trustees ability to elect FRBNY affiliates to the AIG board, and (iii) stating that the Trustees 
were not relieved from exercising their independent judgement despite receiving 
information from the FRNY.  (Starr v. FRBNY 2012, 9-10).7   
The process of vetting potential trustees began in October 2008, although the Trust was not 
formally established until January 2009 (HOGRC 2009, 52-53; FRBNY 2009a, 1). The initial 
three Trustees are identified in Figure 1.  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 The court also held that Delaware fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal law as upholding it would 
have interfered with FRBNY  performing its duties.  (Engelmayer 2012). The decision was upheld by the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (See Walker 2014). 
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Figure 1: Original Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust  
Trustee Name Previous Positions 
Jill M. Considine 
Chairman of the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation 
Chester B. Feldberg Chairman of Barclays Americas 
Douglas L. Foshee 
Chair of the Board of Directors of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Houston Branch, and 
Central Houston, Inc.  
 
Sources: FRBNY 2009a; FRBNY 2010b. 
 
 
Each trustee was paid an annual compensation of $100,000, with costs and expenses 
reimbursed (FRBNY 2009a, Sec. 3.04(a), 13). To fund the Trust’s operations, AIG deposited 
$100,000 into a deposit account and was obligated to continue to fund the costs of the Trust 
(FRBNY 2009a, Sec. 3.04(b), 3.03(e). 13-14). 
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, the purpose of the Trust was to vote the held 
stock, develop and execute a plan to sell or dispose of the Trust’s stock, and work with AIG 
senior management and its board of directors to ensure that corporate governance 
procedures were met satisfactorily and in the best interest of Treasury and the taxpayers 
during the time of the government’s assistance to AIG (FRBNY 2009a, 3–10). To this end, the 
Trustees met regularly with Government Repayment Committee (GRC), a committee formed 
in April 2010 by AIG’s board of directors, composed only of outside directors and charged 
with monitoring and repayment of the government assistance (AIG 2010c). 
The Trust Agreement required the Trustees to “develop a written plan (the Divestiture Plan) 
for the sale or other disposition of the Trust Stock” (FRBNY 2009a, 8). To create and execute 
the Divestiture Plan, the Trust Agreement directed the Trustees to consider (FRBNY 2009a, 
Sec. 2.05, 8): 
1. The effect of any sale or disposition of [Series C preferred stock] on any repayments 
owed to the FRBNY or Treasury; 
2. The impact of any conversion of AIG preferred stock to AIG common stock on anti-
dilution features that affect the Trust (specific to equity units purchased by Bank of 
New York in May 2008); 
3. The financial condition of AIG; 
4. The impact of any sale or disposition of [Series C preferred stock] on general 
financial market conditions; 
5. Obtaining full and adequate consideration for the [Series C preferred stock]; 
6. The best interests of Treasury. 
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To help administer the Trust, the Trustees were authorized to hire (and lease office space 
for) professional advisers and agents as well as administrative, secretarial, and clerical staff 
(FRBNY 2009a, 5).  
AIG issued the Trust Stock to the Trust on March 4, 2009, as described in more detail in the 
“Outcomes” section of this case. The Trust Stock had a perpetual term length and was subject 
to anti-dilution provisions (FRBNY 2008b, Exhibit D). Because of an investment by Treasury 
in November 2008, which included Treasury’s receiving a warrant to purchase up to 2% of 
AIG’s outstanding common stock, the convertibility of the Trust Stock on issuance had been 
adjusted downward to equal 77.9% of AIG’s common stock (GAO 2009, 37 - 38). According 
to the Trust Agreement, the Trustees had the right to vote the Trust Stock and had the ability 
to “exercise all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of a stockholder of the company,” which 
included converting the Trust Stock to AIG common stock (FRBNY 2009a, 6).  
Since AIG had 5 billion authorized shares of common stock at the time the Trust Stock was 
issued and 3 billion shares were already issued, the Trust would have been only able to 
acquire 2 billion, or 40%, of AIG common stock. (AIG 2009b, B-2). Thus, an increase of the 
amount of authorized but unissued shares of common stock was necessary for the Trust to 
receive the full 77.9% of common stock required by the Credit Agreement (FRBNY 2009a, 
1). Further, the Trustees were directed in the Trust Agreement to vote for certain proposals 
that would have facilitated making sufficient shares available to support conversion8 
(FRBNY 2009a, 6). 
Outcomes 
The Trust acquired the Trust Shares on March 4, 2009 (AIG 2009a). Upon obtaining the Trust 
Stock, the Trust received the ability to exercise the voting rights and powers attached to the 
shares, which included receiving any declared dividend payments and converting the 
preferred stock to common stock (AIG 2009a, Sec. 2[a]). The conversion could only occur 
after the RCF was repaid and the adequate amount of authorized AIG common stock became 
available, which was the case after the 2009 Annual Meeting (AIG 2009c).   
Following the purchase, the Trust began to develop the Divestiture Plan for the Trust Stock, 
but as far as we have been able to determine, the plan was likely abandoned or not executed 
once the Treasury took over the stock. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 These provisions were to: 
• Increase the number of authorized shares of AIG common stock from 5 billion to 19 billion 
(decreasing the value from $2.50 to $0.000001 per share) and increase the number of authorized 
shares of AIG preferred stock from 6 million to 13 billion (decreasing the value from $5.00 to 
$0.00004 per share); 
• Amend AIG’s Certificate of Incorporation to change the conversion ratio to equal the quotient from 
dividing the number of underlying shares before the amendment by the number of underlying shares 
after the amendment and make the liquidating preference of Series C preferred stock to be $500,000 
divided by the number of underlying shares (FRBNY 2009a, Section 2.04). 
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After the termination of the Credit Agreement, the Trust converted the Trust Stock to AIG 
common stock and transferred such shares to the Treasury General Fund (FRBNY 2011). 
Treasury gradually sold the stock publicly, aggregating it with the other AIG shares that it 
held (FRBNY 2011). After accounting for all AIG common stock sold, Treasury recorded net 
proceeds of roughly $53 billion from the offerings, resulting in a $4.1 billion gain (Treasury 
2012). More specifically, the 563 million shares of AIG common stock resulting from the 
conversion of the Trust Stock accounted for gross cash proceeds of nearly $17.6 billion 
(Treasury et al. 2010; Webel 2017, 4).  
All three trustees were present at a May 13, 2009 House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee (HOGRC) hearing, where they testified regarding the public rescue of AIG and the 
details of the Trust (HOGRC 2009). The HOGRC examined the Trust’s relationship with AIG, 
the FRBNY, and Treasury, as well as the trustees’ role in managing the Trust Stock and how 
they were exercising the powers of said stock.  
At the AIG Annual Meeting of Shareholders held on June 25, 2009, the Trust voted on 10 of 
11 proposals presented to shareholders,9 including a proposal authorizing a 20-to-1 reverse 
stock split of AIG common shares (AIG 2010a). This proposal reduced the number of 
outstanding AIG shares from approximately 3 billion to 150 million (Starr v. United States 
and AIG 2012, 8). Since there were 4.85 billion shares of AIG common stock authorized but 
unissued, the effect of the proposal was to make possible the conversion of the Trust Stock 
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2012, 8). 
During 2009 and 2010, in consultation with the FRBNY, the Trust nominated and elected 
several new members to AIG’s board of directors. Following AIG’s 2010 Annual Meeting, 11 
of AIG’s then 13-member board were persons nominated by the Trust (Starr v. United States 
and AIG , 8). However, in the interest of avoiding conflicts of interests and maintaining the 
independence of the Trust the Trust agreement provided that no current or person who had 
been an employee of the FRBNY within the last year could be nominated as a director. 
The Trust collaborated with the Government Repayment Committee (GRC), which met 
weekly, and participated in the negotiations between AIG and the government to help the 
two parties find an adequate exit strategy from the relationship between them (AIG 2010c). 
These discussions eventually resulted in the Recapitalization Plan entered into on 
September 30, 201010 (AIG 2010c). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
9 The proposal that the Trust did not vote on pursuant to a prearranged agreement not to vote due to a court 
challenge, would have made available enough authorized, but unissued common AIG stock to enable the 
government to convert the Trust Stock into 77.9% of AIG common stock (Trust Agreement, 1). Ultimately, the 
shares needed for conversion were achieved through a reverse stock split. 
10 For discussion of the Recapitalization Plan, which provided for a restructuring of the government’s 
assistance to AIG, including, inter alia, the repayment of the RCF and conversion of the Trust Stock to common 
stock, see Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a. 
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As part of the Recapitalization Plan, AIG on January 14, 2011, fully repaid the FRBNY the 
outstanding balance under the RCF, effectively terminating the Credit Agreement (Webel 
2017, 15). On this same day, the Trust converted the Trust Stock into nearly 563 million 
shares of AIG common stock and transferred the newly issued common stock to the US 
Treasury General Fund, thereby dissolving the Trust11  (FRBNY 2011; Starr v. United States 
and AIG , 16).  
Over the next two years, through December 2012, Treasury disposed of the AIG common 
stock through a series of six public offerings (Treasury 2012). Treasury reported net 
proceeds from the stock offerings of more than $51.6 billion, a $4.1 billion positive return 
for taxpayers (Treasury 2012). (See also Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b for more information 
on the disposition of AIG common stock by Treasury.) 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The AIG Trust was created as part of a multi-faceted intervention by the 
government. 
The AIG Trust was created to hold Trust Stock, which was issued to the government in 
connection with the FRBNY’s entering into the $85 billion RCF with AIG in September 2008 
to address its severe liquidity needs (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2008).  The RCF 
was the first of a series of government interventions for AIG over a number of years (Webel 
2017; Wiggins et al. 2021). Interventions were funded by the FRBNY and Treasury; included 
loans, asset purchases, and capital investments; and became the government’s largest 
intervention for any one entity to date, totaling $182.3 billion (Treasury 2013, 14). 
2. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York established the Trust pursuant to 
Section 13(3) and Section 4(4) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
The RCF was established on September 16, 2008. After some deliberation, the FRBNY settled 
on the creation of a Trust to hold a 79.9% (later amended to 77.9%) equity interest in AIG 
received in connection with the Credit Facility (Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 20–26; 
FRBNY 2009a, 1). Section 13(3) specified that, “in unusual or exigent circumstances,” the 
Federal Reserve could provide emergency liquidity to an institution that was unable to 
adequately acquire it from private markets.  Section 4(4)’s incidental powers provisions 
permits the Fed to undertake actions incidental to exercising it other powers. (Starr v. United 
States and AIG 2017, 14-22). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11 Upon receipt of the shares resulting from conversion of the Trust Stock, and following the Recapitalization, 
Treasury held more than 1.6 billion shares of AIG common stock equal to approximately 92.1% ownership in 
AIG and consolidated on the government’s balance sheet. (Treasury 2011). For details on the other preferred 
stock Treasury purchased through various TARP investments in AIG, please refer to Buchholtz and Lawson 
2021c. 
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3. The Trust was monitored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, though the 
Trust remained independent and existed “for the sole benefit of the United States 
Treasury.”  
According to the Credit Agreement for the RCF, a preferred stock investment was to be issued 
to a Trust established for the benefit of the United States Treasury (FRBNY 2008b, Exhibit 
D). The later executed Trust Agreement clarified that the Trust was established for the “sole” 
benefit of the Treasury, and explained that, “for the avoidance of doubt, [sole benefit] means 
that any property distributable to the Treasury as a beneficiary hereunder shall be paid to 
the Treasury for deposit into the General Fund as miscellaneous receipts” (FRBNY 2009a). 
The Trust’s three trustees were to be appointed by the FRBNY in consultation with Treasury 
(FRBNY 2009a, 2). 
The Trust Stock itself was held in a “securities account” at a commercial bank selected by 
FRBNY (FRBNY 2009a, 3). However, the Trustees had sole access. FRBNY had no ownership 
interest in any of the Trust Stock or other assets (FRBNY 2009a, 4). The Trustees also had 
access to a deposit account with a balance of $100,000 to be used for any compensation and 
expenses needed to facilitate the operations of the Trust (FRBNY 2009a, 14). Should the 
balance fall below $25,000, AIG was required to inject enough funds to increase the balance 
to $100,000 (FRBNY 2009a, 14). In addition to these accounts, the Trustees could hire “full-
time and part-time administrative, secretarial, and clerical staff,” as well as lease or sublease 
office space needed to perform their duties (FRBNY 2009a, 5). Any litigation efforts against 
the Trust would be fought and paid for by FRBNY, though it would be reimbursed for these 
efforts by the Trust, if needed (FRBNY 2009a, 10). 
Last, Section 4.01 of the Trust Agreement mandated that the Trustees meet with FRBNY on 
at least a quarterly basis to “discuss the administration of the Trust and other topics of 
interest to the parties” (FRBNY 2009a, 17). The same section also required the Trust to 
provide FRBNY with the following reports (FRBNY 2009a, 17–18): 
1. “Monthly custodial reports; 
2. Quarterly summary of significant actions (votes, consents, etc.); 
3. Quarterly reports summarizing the efforts and activities to effect the sale or other 
disposition of the Trust Stock or other Trust Assets; 
4. Minutes of any meetings of the Trustees; and 
5. The Divestiture Plan, as amended from time to time by the Trustees.” 
A number of provisions of the Trust Agreement were designed to ensure the Trust’s 
independence, including provisions (i) giving the Trustees “absolute discretion and control 
over the Trust Stock including how to exercise the voting rights, (ii) limiting the Trustees 
ability to elect FRBNY affiliates to the AIG board, and (iii) stating that the Trustees were not 
relieved from exercising their independent judgement despite receiving information from 
the FRNY.  (Starr v. FRBNY 2012, 9-10) 
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4. The Trust was communicated as an independent vehicle for the interests of the 
Treasury and the taxpayers. 
The Federal Reserve’s first press release regarding the RCF, dated September 16, 2008, 
explicitly mentions that in connection therewith, “The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 
percent equity interest in AIG” (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2008).  However, the 
Fed and Treasury had not yet worked out the details of the structure or governance of the 
equity interest (FRBNY 2008b).  The Fed and AIG signed the Credit Agreement and Pledge 
Agreements on September 22, 2008, and AIG released those agreements publicly in a Form 
8-K filed with the SEC on September 26, 2008, which specified the trust as a part of the 
agreement.12 
It was only on January 16, 2009, that the FRBNY issued a press release on the creation of the 
Trust (FRBNY 2009b). In addition to naming the Trustees, the press release specified that, 
“the Trust has been structured so that the New York Fed cannot exercise any discretion or 
control over the voting and consent rights associated with the equity interest in AIG” (FRBNY 
2009b). Approximately a week later, the FRBNY posted the executed Trustee Agreement 
providing further information about the Trust’s structure and guidelines (FRBNY 2010d). 
In an effort to better explain the purposes of the Trust and the roles and responsibilities of 
the Trustees, the three Trustees testified before the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform on May 13, 2009. The purpose of the hearing, as expressed by Chairman 
Edolphus Towns of New York, was to investigate “the shroud of secrecy that has blanketed 
the entire sequence of [the AIG collapse and the government’s actions]” and to provide 
answers about the use of funds, AIG’s long-term goals, and protection of the taxpayers’ 
interest (HOGRC 2009). This hearing followed significant backlash that AIG received for 
paying out millions of dollars in bonuses to some of the same executives that were 
instrumental in AIG’s difficulties. The most recent set of payments, revealed the week before 
the hearing, totaled about $454 million (HOGRC 2009). 
The Trustees  spoke at length about their ability to influence the upper-level management of 
AIG by “ensuring that AIG has the best, most qualified, independent board of directors that 
it can have.” They were able to nominate members to the board and, as of date of the hearing, 
they had nominated five new candidates to the board and anticipated that they would all be 
approved (HOGRC 2009). Following the 2010 shareholders’ meeting, the Trustees would 
have  nominated and voted for 11 of AIG’s then 13-membe board.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
12 The 8-K is a summation. References to the Trust in total are these (AIG 2008b): 
    “The Credit Facility contains customary affirmative and negative covenants, including a 
requirement to maintain a minimum amount of liquidity and a requirement to use reasonable efforts 
to cause the composition of the Board of Directors of AIG to be satisfactory to the trust described 
below within 10 days after the establishment of the trust. 
      Under the agreement, AIG will issue a new series of perpetual, non-redeemable Convertible 
Participating Serial Preferred Stock (the “Preferred Stock”) to a trust that will hold the Preferred 
Stock for the benefit of the United States Treasury.” 
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In other testimony and interviews, the Trustees, repeatedly discussed how seriously they 
took their fiduciary duties to the Trust. See  for example Feldberg 2019.  
5. The FRBNY established the Trust because it did not have legal authority to own 
shares in AIG directly and to protect the taxpayers’ investment. 
As additional consideration for the RCF, AIG issued the Trust Stock to the Trust. (FRBNY 
2009a, 2). In September 2008, neither the Treasury nor FRBNY had the authority to own a 
controlling equity interest in the company, and thus the Trust was a viable solution to this 
limitation. The establishment of the Trust was “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, and 
disposing of the Trust Stock,” the issuance of which was “intended to provide compensation 
for the assumption of the risks arising from the Credit Agreement and to reduce those risks” 
(Trust Agreement - Preamble). If the government assistance to AIG was successful and AIG 
was able to restructure itself, its stock price would likely increase. Rather than have all that 
value, funded by the government’s lifeline, go only to private stockholders, the Trust Stock 
would ensure that the taxpayers also received some of that benefit, which they ultimately 
did to the amount of $17.6 billion dollars of profit (Geithner 2014, 196–197; Webel 2017). 
Although criticized by some AIG stockholders and others, “the terms of the Federal Reserve 
credit [including the requirement for the Trust Stock] were modeled on terms prepared for 
a private sector lender that ultimately decided not to take the risk of lending to AIG after 
Lehman failed” (Alvarez and Dudley 2018, 19). 
Establishment of the Trust was deemed necessary by Fed counsel because although Section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act gave the Federal Reserve the authority to lend to a private 
company, it did not, nor did any other authority, allow the FRBNY to own a controlling equity 
interest and act as a shareholder in a company (Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 59–60).  
The Fed also considered “gifting” the Trust Stock to Treasury, and having it own the shares, 
but the Treasury only felt it could receive the shares this way if the Fed used a trust; Treasury 
also lacked the authority to hold voting stock in AIG13 (YPFS 2018).  
These conclusions were testified to in a later lawsuit brought by AIG shareholders 
challenging the Fed’s ownership as summarized by the court in its 2015 decision (Starr v. 
United States and AIG 2015, 60): 
“The legal staffs of FRBNY and the Federal Reserve acknowledged that they could 
not obtain or hold equity, or acquire voting control, of a commercial entity.  FRBNY’s 
general counsel, Mr. [Thomas] Baxter, noted during an interview on May 11, 2010:  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
13 According to Scott Alvarez, Federal Reserve Board General Counsel at the time, Treasury was restricted by 
the fact that no funds had been appropriated for the purchase of AIG shares (YPFS 2018). The Anti-Deficiency 
Act states that “an officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia 
government may not… (B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money 
before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law” (Government Publishing Office 2007b). 
Additionally, after its passage in October 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 
provided a basis for the Treasury to hold the shares (YPFS 2018). 
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Neither the Fed nor the [T]reasury had authority to hold the shares. When 
we saw equity on term sheet—problem of legal ownership and the conflict.  
Maybe strike that and not take equity. But then thought of taxpayer. Create a 
trust, put shares in trust. For benefit of American people.  We had to decide 
that right away.  
. . . Mr. Baxter notified the Board of Governors’ counsel, Mr. Alvarez, on October 23, 
2008, “we agree that there is no power” for the Federal Reserve “to hold AIG shares.”14 
Moreover, as Board of Governors General Counsel Scott Alvarez later testified, there would 
also have existed a conflict of interest if the FRBNY was both the lender and owner of AIG, 
because “the owner and the lender don’t always have the same interest” ( Starr v. United 
States and AIG 2015, 60).  
Alvarez noted in an interview with the Yale Program on Financial Stability, however, that the 
Fed authority to hold shares was not perfectly clear: “there is a good argument that we could 
[hold the shares], we just didn't want to get to that bridge because there were a variety of 
policy implications and other reasons” (YPFS 2018).15 
Additionally, a draft memo written by the Fed’s Legal Division on September 17, 2008 notes 
that the issue of whether a Reserve Bank could “acquire, hold, vote the equity securities it 
obtains . . . does not need to be addressed at this time” (Legal Division 2008). 
6. The Trust was managed by three independent Trustees appointed by the 
FRBNY in consultation with Treasury. 
On January 16, 2009, the FRBNY, in consultation with Treasury, appointed three individuals 
to manage the Trust. The Trustees were not involved in the decision to develop the Trust; 
but were all seasoned professionals. Trustee Feldberg had worked at the FRBNY for 36 years; 
Trustee Considine was a former member of the FRBNY’s board; and Trustee Foshee was the 
sitting chair of the board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas while a Trustee 
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 30).    
In a joint statement before a House Committee, the Trustees noted that the use of a trust was 
“viewed by Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department as a way to place the 
government’s interest in AIG in the hands of experienced individuals who could act without 
risk of conflicts of interest that would be present if such controlling interest was held by the 
FRBNY or the Department of the Treasury” (HOGRC 2009, 77) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
14 However, Baxter also testified that he did not remember claiming such and that a statement that the Fed 
could not own shares “is not consistent with my views” (Zajac 2014).  
15 See page 18  for discussion of a concurring opinion by Justice Wallach of the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals considering this issue (Starr v. United States and AIG 2017). 
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FRBNY General Counsel Baxter also has stated that nominating three Trustees to run the 
Trust rather than one acted as an “additional safeguard” for the oversight of AIG, one of the 
world’s largest insurance companies (US Court of Federal Claims 2014, 937). 
7. The Trustees managed the Trust independently, subject to certain limitations. 
The purpose of the Trust was to serve as the shareholder of the Trust Stock “for the sole 
benefit of the Treasury” and to provide returns for “the American people”; any Trust assets 
transferred to Treasury would be transferred directly to Treasury’s General Fund (FRBNY 
2009a, 2). The Trustees were to exercise the rights of the Trust Stock, receive dividends, and 
participate in shareholder meetings and votes in place of the FRBNY, but not for the benefit 
of the Treasury and taxpayer (FRBNY 2009a, 6–8).  
Moreover, to avoid “conflicts and legal impediments that could arise from either the US 
government or the FRBNY exerting control over the world’s largest insurer,” the Trust 
provided that the three Trustees would independently manage the Trust and oversee the 
Trust Stock (FRBNY 2010a). The Trust Agreement states that since the Trust aims “to avoid 
any possible conflict with its supervisory and monetary policy functions, the FRBNY does not 
intend to exercise any discretion or control over the voting and consent rights associated 
with the Trust Stock” (FRBNY 2009a, 2). 
Prior to the creation of the Trust, the Trustees sent a memorandum to FRBNY General 
Counsel Baxter pointing out that there was a potential conflict between the goals described 
in Section 2.04(d) of the Trust Agreement ( Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 31). The 
Trustees were expected to maximize AIG’s ability to repay advances under the Credit 
Agreement, but they were also expected to avoid disrupting financial market conditions in 
the “best interests of the stockholders of the Company.” The government later clarified that 
the two goals were “non-binding” on the Trustees’ discretionary power to vote the Trust 
Stock ( Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 31). 
Trustee Feldberg testified that “the three-Trustee model . . . expects us to act through a 
consensus, and to the maximum extent possible to act in unanimity” (HOGRC 2009). Mr. 
Feldberg stated that the Trust provided “a mechanism so that if we cannot agree, two of the 
three trustees could go forward” (HOGRC 2009).  
The Trustees were to use their own discretion in managing the shares and exercising the 
powers and rights of the preferred stock held by the Trust (FRBNY 2009a, 2). As 
shareholders, they voted to elect directors. Trustees did not attend AIG Board meetings but 
they did have regular discussions with senior management, board members, and Federal 
Reserve and Treasury officials (HOGCR 2009).16  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
16 In contrast to the Trustees’ lack of attendance at AIG board meetings, former AIG CEO Ed Liddy testified 
before Congress that representatives of the Federal Reserve attended nearly every meeting (HOGRC 2009). 
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Additionally, there were still some limitations on the Trustees’ independence. According to 
the Trust Agreement, before selling or disposing of the Trust Stock, the Trust required 
approval from the FRBNY, which would consult with Treasury (FRBNY 2009a, 8– 9).  
The Trust was mandated to provide the FRBNY various records, such as: “monthly custodial 
reports; quarterly summar[ies] of significant actions (votes, consents, etc.); quarterly 
reports summarizing the efforts and activities to effect the sale or other disposition of the 
Trust Stock or other Trust Assets; minutes of any meetings of the Trustees; and the 
Divestiture Plan, as amended from time to time” (FRBNY 2009a, 17–18). 
8. The Trust was tasked with creating a Divestiture Plan for the Trust Stock. 
To recoup the investment by the FRBNY and the Treasury, the Trust was tasked to create a 
written Divestiture Plan to sell or otherwise dispose of the Series C preferred stock (FRBNY 
2009a, 8). The Trust Agreement spelled out that the divestiture of the Trust Stock was to be 
done in a value-maximizing manner. Furthermore, the sale or disposition of Trust Stock 
could be completed only after the FRBNY was fully repaid for funds drawn under the RCF, 
and after Treasury no longer owned any TARP-related preferred stock of AIG17 (FRBNY 
2009a, 18). Even with a Divestiture Plan, the Trustees could only sell or dispose of any stock 
after the FRBNY, in consultation with Treasury, granted approval to the Trust. (FRBNY 
2009a, 8). As far as we have been able to discern, the Divestiture Plan was never completed 
or executed upon since Treasury took over the sale of the Trust Shares. 
9. The Trust Agreement provided an exit plan.  
The Trust Agreement provided that the Trust would terminate upon the earlier of “(i) the 
sale or other disposition of all of the Trust Stock [including any common stock received on 
conversion, which could only occur after repayment and termination of the RCF] such that 
no Trust Stock continues to be held in trust hereunder; or (ii) the Company shall have been 
liquidated and shall cease to exist or a plan of reorganization or liquidation shall have been 
confirmed and consummated providing for no distribution in respect of the Trust Stock”  
(FRBNY 2009a, 21). Thus, from its inception, the Trust Agreement anticipated two different 
outcomes: one where the rescue was successful and the Trustees followed their mandate to 
transfer the Trust Stock to the Treasury, and a second that likely would have been the result 
of failure of the intervention. 
On January 14, 2011, a Master Transaction Agreement, effectuating the Recapitalization 
Plan, was entered into by AIG (and certain related entities), the FRBNY, the Treasury, and 
the Trust (FRBNY 2010c). The agreement and plan provided for the repayment of all 
amounts owed to the FRBNY pursuant to the RCF and for the RCF’s termination.  Following 
the termination of the RCF, the Trustees converted the Trust Stock and transferred the 
resulting common stock to the Treasury General Fund (FRBNY 2011). As discussed, this had 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
17 The preferred stock references mentioned here refer to the more senior Series D preferred stock (later 
Series E preferred stock) and Series F preferred stock that Treasury acquired through the AIG Investment 
Program; see Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b for further discussion. 
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the effect of dissolving the Trust and terminating the Trust Agreement (FRBNY 2009a, 21). 
The Trust Agreement also provided that any additional funds held in the Trust’s deposit 
account as well as any other assets (or the proceeds thereof), were also to be transferred to 
the Treasury (FRBNY 2009a, 21). 
 
III. Evaluation 
The AIG Credit Facility Trust was arguably successful in protecting the interests of American 
taxpayers and the US government. The Trust held the Trust Stock for almost two years, 
utilizing the “rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties” attached to the shares, 
specifically the voting powers, until January 2011 (FRBNY 2009a, 5; Webel 2017, 15). The 
Trust helped to elect new AIG Board members, resulting in a largely board that replaced the 
board that had overseen the firm’s troubles (Starr v. United States and AIG 2012 , 48). 
During a May 2009 HOGRC hearing on the structure and role of the Trust, Congress 
expressed a number of concerns about the government’s intervention and relationship with 
AIG. Among these were a request for more transparency, clarification on whether the goal of 
serving a public purpose was being met, and concern whether the US taxpayer investment 
in AIG was adequately protected (HOGRC 2009).  
The Trustee structure was also criticized by some legislators caused some representatives 
to question the Trustees’ independence. They pointed to the reports that the Trust was 
required to provide o the FRBNY and were also very critical of the access that the FRBNY had 
to AIG Board meetings, which the Trustees did not attend (HOGRC 2009).  
The Trustees said that they were not accountable to the FRBNY but consulted with FRBNY 
officials on significant issues (HOGRC 2009).18  (Moreover, the FRBNY had a team of about 
15 officials stationed at AIG full-time to monitor developments and keep FRBNY 
management and the Trustees informed.) The Trustees also repeatedly emphasized that 
they were acting on behalf of the US taxpayer. Trustee Douglas Foshee even went as far as to 
say that, “[We], as trustees, [are] more than happy to put our reputational risk in front of this 
committee and act on behalf of the US taxpayers” (HOGCR 2009).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
18 For example, this exchange: “Mr. Kucinich. So would it be fair to assume that the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York has a significant role in monitoring the work of the trustees? 
    Mr. Feldberg. Yeah. I would say that they have a significant interest in the work of the trustees. 
    Mr. Kucinich. Are you trustees on behalf of the Federal Reserve Bank or are you trustees on behalf of the US 
Treasury? 
    Mr. Foshee. We're trustees on behalf of the trust that holds the 79 percent equity on behalf of the US Treasury. 
    Mr. Kucinich. And then can you explain to this committee then why do you respond to the Fed, why is this 
trust agreement structured so that your accountability is to the Fed? 
    Ms. Considine. I don't think that's the reading that I would give to it, because No. 1, in terms of visibility of 
our responsibility, our responsibility is to act as the shareholder, and that is to vote the shares . . .. As part of 
the agreement, yes, we are to provide minutes and of course expenses back to the Fed. But we were selected to 
be totally independent trustees, and I believe that's the way we function” (HOGRC 2009). 
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During the hearing, Professor J.W. Verret, an assistant professor of law at George Mason Law 
School, also testified to discuss the flaws of the Trust and the Trust Agreement and why the 
government should be careful in using the Trust as a model for other trusts in the future 
(HOGRC 2009). Specifically, Verret singled out provisions that provided protections against 
liability for each of the Trustees; he considered the indemnity and immunity provisions too 
generous. (HOGRC 2009, 2).  
A May 2010 Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) hearing concluded that the government 
used a trust structure to manage the Trust Stock not only to avoid conflicts of interest, but 
also “so as to not violate the Government Corporation Control Act . . . which prohibits the 
government from owning a corporation without specific Congressional authorization” (COP 
2009, 71). The COP concluded that the Trust played two roles that benefited Treasury and 
the shareholding taxpayers: the role as shareholders “who want to maximize the return on 
their investments” and the role as taxpayers “who want the financial system stabilized” (COP 
2009). COP member J. Mark McWatters posited that the utilization of a trust structure to 
manage the Trust Stock “may prolong the disposition process and appear to make 
government-sponsored bailouts somehow more palatable to the taxpayers” (COP 2010, 
296).  
Although the Trust had the capability of ensuring that AIG had a responsible, independent, 
and effective board of directors, the question remained whether changing AIG’s board and 
nominating new members had any tangible effect on the company. Nicola Sharpe, Professor 
of Law at the University of Illinois, College of Law, has argued that it hasn’t (Sharpe 2011, 
107):  
“…While having trusted representatives such as the AIG trustees elect skilled and 
respected board members may pacify the public and appear to protect the large 
federal investment in the 500 or so corporations it has bailed out, it does not solve 
the problem of inadequate board monitoring as a contributing factor in corporate 
ruin and, in fact, creates additional regulatory challenges.” 
Some suggested that there may have been cause for regulatory concern over the lack of 
supervision of the Trustees in this respect, given that they were mandated to act 
independently (Davidoff 2009). There were arguments that there was nothing stopping 
them, as independent trustees, from acting improperly (though they had not done anything 
at this point to warrant such concerns), electing unqualified board members or members 
that they have pre-existing relationships with “so long as their decisions are not contrary to 
the interests of the government” (Davidoff 2009). The sole limitations for this role were to 
elect “only persons who are not, and have not been within one year of their nomination, 
officers, directors, or senior employees of the FRBNY or the Treasury Department,” which it 
fulfilled (FRBNY 2009a). Otherwise, the Trustees were required only to act in or not against 
Treasury’s interests and to use their best judgment when making decisions concerning the 
Trust Stock. However, the indemnity clauses and protections in the Trust Agreement and the 
Master Transaction Agreement protected the Trustees from further audit, liabilities, or 
damages at the termination of the Agreements on January 14, 2011 (FRBNY 2009a, 13). 
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Despite the work that went into its design, the equity kicker and the Trust were challenged 
in court by one of AIG’s largest shareholder, Starr International.  The Claims Court ruled for 
the plaintiff finding an illegal extraction but awarding no damages. In his opinion Justice 
Wheeler looked through the Trust to find that the FRBNY controlled the rust, which he held 
not to be independent.19  This decision was overturned by the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals which found that Starr did not have standing to bring the lawsuit because its claims 
belonged to the company and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant cert in March of 2018 
(SCOTUS 2018).  
 
The lower court decision was vacated so it does not have precedential value, however, in its 
vacated decision, the Claims Court expressed the opinion that the creation of the Trust to 
hold the shares was not sufficient to avoid the finding of an illegal exaction because the trust 
was not truly independent. Factors cited in support of this finding included that it had  been 
established by the Fed, that the “independent” trustees were appointed by the Fed and had 
close affiliations to the Fed, and that during the Trust’s existence there were close 
communications between the Fed and the Trust. (Wheeler 2015, 62-63). These conclusions 
were rendered moot when the case was overturned and vacated by the Court  of Appeals.  
Additionally, Justice Wallach of the appellate court, writing in a concurring opinion, would 
have found that government’s actions were authorized (and therefore could not be the basis 
of an illegal exaction claim) because Section 13(3), read together with Section 4(4)’s  
incidental powers provision,  does not prohibit the taking of equity as the term of a loan. 
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2017, 14-22).  
It is also worth noting that in a related case brought by Starr against the FRBNY (Starr v. 
FRBNY 2012,)  the district court, in considering the FRBNY’s motion to dismiss, found the 
opposite of the Federal Claims Court. Writing for the majority,  Justice Engelmayer, 
determined that the FRBNY had not breached its fiduciary duty to AIG under Delaware 
corporate law because no such fiduciary duty existed since the FRBNY (1) did not control 
AIG as a majority shareholder, nor (2) did it exercise actual control over the company.  In 
reaching its decision the court pointed to several provisions of the Trust Agreement 
supporting this conclusion including provisions (i) giving the Trustees “absolute discretion 
and control over the Trust Stock including how to exercise the voting rights, (ii) limiting the 
Trustees ability to elect FRBNY affiliates to the AIG board, and (iii) stating that the Trustees 
were not relieved from exercising their independent judgement despite receiving 
information from the FRNY.  (Starr v. FRBNY 2012, 9-10).20   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
19 “The trustees were the ‘protectors of the Federal equity stake in AIG’. . . The manner in which FRBNY 
controlled AIG with its handpicked CEO, carefully selected board members, and its hundreds of on-premises 
advisers belies any conclusion that the operations of the trust were independent.” (Starr v. United States and 
AIG 2012, 63). 
20 The court also held that Delaware fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal law as upholding it would 
have interfered with FRBNY  performing its duties.  (Starr v. FRBNY 2012,). The decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (See Walker 2014). 
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preferred stock to common shares, the repurchase of preferred shares in SPVs by AIG, the 
termination of the AIG Credit Facility Trust, and delivery of any other certificates, agreements, 
or documents by all parties. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Master_Transa
ction_Agreement_20101208.pdf 
Recapitalization Plan Summary of Terms (09/30/2010) – Document explaining the terms of 
the full recapitalization of AIG and the effective termination of the Credit Facility through the 
net proceeds received from AIA IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the sale of ALICO 
to MetLife, Inc., as well as the repurchase of preferred shares in the AIA and ALICO SPVs by 
AIG from the Federal Reserve. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3289 
Registration Rights Agreement (01/14/2011) – Agreement between AIG and US Treasury 
for the issuance by AIG of 1.655 billion shares of common stock to Treasury as part of 
Recapitalization, through the common stock held by the Trust from the Credit Agreement and 
the common stock converted from all other preferred stock Treasury received through 
government aid packages to AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Registration_Rights_Ag
reement_20110114_2.pdf 
Securities Purchase Agreement: Series D Preferred Stock (11/25/2008) – Purchase 
agreement entered into by AIG and US Treasury to sell 4 million shares of Series D fixed-rate, 
cumulative, perpetual preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 53.8 million shares of 
common stock to Treasury for $40 billion under TARP’s Systematically Significant Failing 
Institutions (SSFI) program. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Securities_Purchase
_Agreement_Series_D_Preferred_Stock_20081125.pdf 
Series C Certificate of Designations (03/01/2009) – Document announcing the intent to 
issue 100,000 shares of Series C perpetual, convertible, participating preferred stock on March 
4, 2009, in accordance with the Credit Agreement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Designati
ons_Series_C_Preferred_Stock_20090301_0.pdf 
Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement 
(03/01/2009) – Purchase agreement entered into by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and AIG for the 100,000 shares of Series C stock issued through the Certificate of Designations 




Government Publishing Office. United States Code, Title 12, Banks and Banking. (2007) – 
Statutory title governing emergency lending by the Federal Reserve. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/USCODE-2007-title12.pdf 
Press Releases/Announcements 
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Federal Reserve Board and Treasury Department announce restructuring of financial 
support to AIG (11/10/2008) – Press release announcing a $40 billion investment through 
TARP in AIG and changes to the Credit Facility including reduction of the RCF to $60 billion, 




New York Fed Ends AIG Assistance with Full Repayment (01/14/2011) – Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York announcement of termination of the financial assistance to AIG, after AIG 
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Treasury Announces the Completion of AIG’s Recapitalization (01/14/2011) – Treasury 
announcement that AIG’s Recapitalization Plan is complete, the Credit Agreement has been 
terminated, and the AIG Credit Facility Trust has been dissolved. Also, Treasury now owns 




Treasury to Invest in AIG Restructuring Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(11/10/2008) – Press release announcing the purchase of $40 billion in Series D senior 
preferred stock through TARP to help pay down existing loans of the Credit Facility.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_to_I
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conducted its final IPO of AIG common stock, realizing an overall positive return of $5 billion 




US Government Provides Support for Continued Restructuring of AIG (03/02/2009) – AIG 
press release announcing restructuring plan to reduce debt owed to the government and the 
intent to establish two special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for AIA and ALICO and the issuance of 
preferred stock within each for the Federal Reserve, which will invest $26 billion in the SPVs. 
The amount of the Credit Facility is also drawn down to $35 billion. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Press_Release_U.S._Gov
ernment_Provides_Support_For_Continued_Restructuring_Of_AIG_20090302_1.pdf 
US Treasury and Federal Reserve Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan 
(03/02/2009) – Joint press release announcing a restructuring plan for AIG which includes 
investing in two special purpose vehicles for AIG subsidiaries AIA and ALICO, the removal of 
the interest rate floor on the Credit Facility, and the issuance of Series C Preferred Stock from 




Short-Term Solutions to Long-Term Problems (New York Times – 03/26/2009) – Steven M. 
Davidoff, known for his legal work on takeovers and corporate law, describing some of the 
problems with the government’s approach in programs and interventions during the financial 
crisis, specifically with AIG and Citigroup. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_Short-
Term_Solutions_to_Long-Term_Problems_20090326.pdf 
Three Trustees of A.I.G. Are Quiet, Perhaps to a Fault (New York Times – 04/19/2009) – 
News article discussing the goals of the AIG Credit Facility Trust and their role in acting as the 
beneficiary of Treasury’s shares in AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_3_Trustees_of_AIG_Are
_Quiet_Perhaps_to_a_Fault_20090419.pdf 
Key Academic Papers 
Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis (Sharpe, 06/2011) –
Essay discussing corporate governance issues in the wake of government involvement at the 





AIG 10-Q (SEC, 06/30/2009) – AIG Q2 2009 financial filing to the SEC stressing that it posted 








House Oversight and Government Reform Committee: AIG Collapse, Rescue, Trustees 
(05/13/2009) – Transcript of a hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee, where the three trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust and J.W. Verret, a 
Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, testified to the Committee about 
the role, responsibilities, and intent of the Trust associated with government financial 




June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit 
Strategy (06/10/2010) – Congressional Oversight Panel report on AIG’s rescue, highlighting 
hearing testimonies, government actions, and impacts of government intervention.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4354 
Starr International Co. v. United States and American International Group, Inc. (United 
States Court of Federal Claims, 06/15/2015) – Opinion and order from the Court of Federal 
Claims stating that the government did conduct an illegal exaction of AIG, but zero damages 
are awarded as there were no economic consequences to shareholders as a result of actions. 




Starr International Co. v. United States and American International Group, Inc. (United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 08/25/2015) – Starr International Co. files 
its opening brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, appealing the 
decision of the US Court of Federal Claims in June 2015. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Court_of_Appeals_for_th
e_Federal_Circuit_SICO_Plaintiffs_Appeal_20150825.pdf 
Starr International Co. v. United States and American International Group, Inc. (United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 05/09/2017) – Opinion filed by Chief Judge 
Reyna and Circuit Judge Wallach on the lawsuit filed by Starr International Co. against the US 
government on its acquisition of equity interests in AIG and the actions related to a reverse-
stock split at the 2009 annual shareholder meeting. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Court_of_Appeals_for_th
e_Federal_Circuit_Opinion_by_Reyna_and_Wallach_20170509.pdf 
Statement of the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility before the House Oversight Committee 
on Collapse and Federal Rescue of AIG (05/13/2009) – Statement from the three trustees of 
the AIG Credit Facility Trust to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, prior 
to their attendance to the hearing on May 13, 2009, reciting their responsibilities and 




The Use of TARP Funds in Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive 
Industry (Congressional Oversight Panel, 09/09/2009) – Report from the Congressional 
Oversight Panel’s describing the TARP support provided to General Motors and Chrysler, 
where the Panel reflects on some of the decisions made with AIG and how to make similar 
programs or designs as the government continued to support the automotive industry. 
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J.W. Verret Testimony before the House Oversight Committee Concerning the AIG Trust 
(05/13/2009) – Testimony to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
presenting three flaws in the AIG Trust Agreement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Verret_Testimony_before_H
ouse_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_20090513.pdf 
Written Testimony of Herbert M. Allison Jr., Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, 
Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
(12/17/2009) – Written testimony to the House Subcommittee of the Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee describing the objectives the government wishes to achieve in 












Appendix A: Timeline  
September 16, 2008:  The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, with the support of 
the US Treasury, authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY) to make an $85 billion emergency credit line 
available to American International Group, Inc. (AIG) to 
prevent AIG’s failure by providing sufficient liquidity and 
“make appropriate dispositions of certain assets over time.” 
 
September 22, 2008:  AIG and the FRBNY sign the Credit Agreement and Guarantee 
and Pledge Agreement that implements the Revolving Credit 
Facility (RCF), with a maturity date of September 22, 2010. The 
Agreement also provides that AIG will sell 100,000 shares of 
Series C Preferred Stock, convertible into 79.9% of AIG’s 
common stock (the Trust Stock), to an independent trust to be 
created for the sole benefit of the US Treasury. 
 
November 10, 2008:  AIG and Treasury agree in principle, under the Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP), for Treasury to purchase $40 billion in 
newly issued Series D Preferred Stock and a warrant to 
purchase 2% of AIG’s common stock outstanding.  
 
November 25, 2008:  The second amendment to the Credit Agreement is 
implemented, and the Series D Warrant is sold to Treasury, 
effectively reducing the Trust Stock equity stake to 77.9%. The 
amendment also notes that AIG common stockholders will vote 
as a separate class on first proposal to issue new common 
shares.   
 
January 16, 2009: The FRBNY announces the establishment of the independent 
AIG Credit Facility Trust (the Trust), headed by three 
appointed trustees, which will hold the Trust Stock. 
 
March 1, 2009: AIG files a Certificate of Designations agreeing to issue the 
Trust Stock to the Trust.  
 
March 4, 2009: AIG and the Trust agree to a Securities Purchase Agreement, 
pursuant to which AIG will sell the Trust Stock to the Trust in 
exchange for a $500,000 consideration. 
 
June 30, 2009: The AIG Annual Meeting of Shareholders takes place, where 
common stockholders vote down the increase in the number of 
authorized AIG common shares. However, a vote approving a 
1:20 reverse stock split passes, providing the shares needed to 
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allow the Trust, and Treasury, to convert their preferred stock 
into AIG common stock. 
 
September 30, 2010: Treasury, the FRBNY, and the Trust announce an agreement on 
a comprehensive Recapitalization Plan (the Plan) for AIG 
designed to recoup all loans by the US government, including 
all loans under the RCF, and to end the ownership relationship 
between the government and AIG. 
 
December 8, 2010: AIG, the two special purpose vehicles (SPVs)—ALICO Holdings 
and AIA Aurora LLC—the FRBNY, Treasury, and the Trust 
enter into a Master Transaction Agreement based on the terms 
set in the Plan. The Plan involves AIG’s repaying any remaining 
debt under the RCF, the conversion of the Trust’s and 
Treasury’s preferred stock into AIG common stock, and the 
transfer of the common stock received by the Trust on 
conversion to Treasury, resulting in the dissolution of the 
Trust. 
 
January 14, 2011: The FRBNY announces that AIG has completed the repayment 
of all loans provided by the RCF and that the Credit Agreement 
is subsequently terminated. Treasury exchanges its $49.1 
billion of Series E and Series F TARP-related preferred stock 
into AIG common stock. The Trust also converts the Trust 
Stock into AIG common stock and transfers the stock over to 
Treasury’s General Fund, thereby dissolving the Trust. 
Treasury’s overall ownership in AIG rises to roughly 92.1%. 
 
December 10, 2012: Treasury sells the last of its ownership stake in AIG in its sixth 
and final offering of AIG common stock, netting more than $51 
billion in gross cash proceeds. Proceeds amounting to $17.6 
billion came from the AIG common stock received by the Trust 
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